Some Restrictions on R&D Networks
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.26713/jims.v11i2.947Keywords:
R&D Network game, Market structure, Equilibria, Maximum outcomesAbstract
We use an R&D network model by Goyal and Moraga-Gonzalez [13] to maximize the equilibrium outcomes. We focus on the effectiveness of R&D expenditures and its effect on the outcomes. We find that characteristics of markets and networks influence values of the effectiveness. The change of this parameter has a negative impact on the individual and social outcomes.
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